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Abstract 
 
This paper draws on the story of the collapse B.P. Sayers, a 100 year old family-owned 
stock broking firm as a result of the fraudulent use of clients’’ money by the junior 
partner in the firm.  The paper presents three competing stories of the closure of Sayers 
written in accordance with Bakhtin's notion of polyphony. These stories are used as a 
platform to discuss possible explanations for fraud.  The stories clearly articulate some 
explanations which have received coverage hitherto in the literature on financial and 
moral scandals such as inappropriate succession and leadership failure in family business 
which will be discussed in brief.  However, it is the explanation which emerges from an 
engagement with the third   story which is particularly compelling, and leads to an 
investigation of the relationship between workaholism and fraud in organizations.  
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Introduction 
Moral scandal has received considerable attention by organization and management 
scholars in recent years and continues to do so as the ethical practices of business 
particularly in the financial sector come into sharp focus as a result of inappropriate 
lending practices, and questionable reward systems.  Recent research on moral scandals 
has focussed on the psychic meaning of corruption (see e.g. Levine 2005) and the 
narcissistic tendencies driving corruption (see e.g. Morris et al. 2005, Knights and 
O’Leary 2005, 2006).  Fuelled by an interest in understanding the kind of moral 
breakdown that leads to fraud and ultimately bankruptcy, this paper considers in detail 
the practices of one organization which folded as a result of embezzlement by the junior 
partner in the firm.   The first section of the paper will simply present three accounts of 
the closure of B.P. Sayers; the second section will discuss the benefits of a 
methodological approach which draws on the concepts of   polyphony and ethnographic-
fiction.  The third section will engage with some explanations that emerge from these 
stories such as succession in family business and leadership failure.  Finally, the fourth 
section will concentrate in more detail on workaholism as a possible explanation for 
deviant behaviour including fraud. 
 
Then we came to the End 
 
This case involves the story of the closure of B.R. Sayers as a result of the actions of 
junior partner, Peter Berlin whose gambling in ‘futures’ led to heavy losses, which he 
tried to rectify by embezzling client’s funds.  The actions of Peter Berlin led to a major 
securities fraud, marked the end of a family tradition in business of over 100 years, and 
the end of the stock broking careers of almost all of the employees of the company.  What 
follows are three stories of the closure of B.P. Sayers, constructed by me from in-depth 
interviews, newspaper reports and court documents.1 
 
                                                 
1 Due to the sensitive nature of this case, the identities of interviewees are protected and a pseudonym is 
used for the company. 
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Story 1: The Collapse of B.P. Sayers 
 
Peter Berlin brought the 100 year-old family firm of B.P.Sayers, in which he was junior 
partner, to a sad ending. Berlin engaged in fraudulent activities over a period of five 
years, siphoning off £5.5m in clients’ money to fund purchases and make good losses on 
futures.  The company later collapsed with losses of £12 m.  Berlin pleaded guilty to 
charges of fraudulently converting client’s funds; forgery and obtaining funds under false 
pretences.  The victims of Berlin’s rogue trading were chosen at random and ranged from 
long-term wealthy clients of the firm to individuals who sought a return on small amounts 
of money and included also a number of charities.  Berlin was sentenced to five years 
imprisonment. 
 
Regarding the beginning of the end, a red-flag was raised in the office over a debit from a 
client account to an investment club account, thought to be made up of a select group of 
high net-worth clients.  In reality, this was Berlin’s personal trading account.  Berlin’s 
junior colleagues realised that he seemed to be concealing losses and brought it to the 
attention of senior partner Saul Sayers.  The following morning Sayers confronted Berlin 
who fled the scene, and was subsequently admitted to a psychiatric hospital after an 
attempted suicide.  In the immediate aftermath of the firm’s collapse Berlin was under 
medical care but once he had been treated he cooperated fully with the receiver and the 
court. In a court hearing into the liquidation of the company, Berlin pointed out that he 
was the only one involved in the fraud and that neither staff nor the firm’s senior partner 
Saul Sayers were aware of what he was doing. 
 
Later the court heard from a clinical psychologist that Peter Berlin suffered from a 
personality disorder leading to irresponsible behaviour. Berlin gained nothing financially 
from the fraud and in fact, his own family were among the biggest losers.  The fraud 
triggered several bouts of litigation as the liquidator sought to use the client’s funds to 
pay his costs.  Several years later, many clients still await having their compensation 
claims to be settled.   
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Story 2: The Reluctant Leader 
 
Saul Sayers was a reluctant stockbroker.  He often said that he was pushed into stock 
broking, and just like his cousin, Peter Berlin, he was first pushed into the priesthood.  A 
Priest or a stockbroker were both respectable careers in his father’s eyes. Sayers never 
left the family home where he lived for many years under a very domineering father, who 
monitored him closely at home and work for more than 20 years. Eventually Saul Sayers 
took over as Senior Partner of B.P. Sayers’ with 60% share of the company set up by his 
grandfather 100 years before. 
 
Sayers was devastated when he discovered some malpractices.  He confronted Berlin 
who made some admissions but said that he would sell some assets and fix the losses.  He 
disappeared and never came back.  Berlin’s wife rang and was distraught as she had no 
idea where he was.  Sayers had to break the news to her.  He also had to deal with the 
fiasco, issuing a press release, determining solvency, making a presentation to the Central 
Bank.  Sayers started to sell personal assets at that stage; he was working from 6 a.m. to 
midnight.  One of the brokers walked out and it was a very difficult time.  He was left to 
unravel the tangled web of deception woven by Berlin.  Sayers took some comfort from 
the good wishes and sympathy from other professionals in the financial and legal district 
and from former clients. Nobody held him responsible. 
 
 
The fraudulent episode however should not have taken Saul Sayers by surprise. Sayers 
had allowed Berlin to remain with the firm after racking up huge personal trading losses 
nearly ten years previously. At that time, Berlin had also used monies and stocks without 
client authorisation, something that was not reported to the stock exchange. However, the 
firm was able to contain its losses and with Berlin’s father as a partner at that time, 
Sayers didn’t feel that he could engage in any further monitoring of Berlin. But what is 
most surprising is that Berlin was later made junior partner and took control of 40% of 
the company when his father retired.  Berlin’s seniority made it even easier for him to 
engage in fraud. Saul Sayers was weak and failed to take action when those problems 
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were first identified with Berlin but you can see why he was reluctant because going 
public would ultimately mean dissolution of the partnership and the his career.  Sayers 
had an inflated ego; he owned 60% of the shares and had very little interest in his cousin 
who had 40%.  He was close to retirement and he didn’t want all of this hassle.  It was a 
dysfunctional organization, with little direction, no communication between the partners 
and hardly any formal meetings.  
 
Story 3: From Benedictine to Broker 
 
Peter Berlin, a former Benedictine monk, brought the 100 year-old family firm of B.P. 
Sayers, in which he was junior partner, to its feet, siphoning off £5.7m in clients’ money 
to fund purchases and make good losses on futures. 
 
Berlin was one of a family of 12 children and it well-known that he was the least 
successful of the family, failing in university.  He was a drop-out.  All his siblings 
became doctors and lawyers with successful careers.  Berlin came from a high-profile and 
very influential family.  His father, a former partner in B.P. Sayers, was an immaculately 
presented and very competent and well-respected man.  After dropping out of University, 
Berlin joined the monastery. At that time the religious life was often a path taken to make 
your parents proud.  His father and the family were very religious.  Berlin was about to 
take his final vows  but decided that he wasn’t cut-out for life in a monastery and just like 
with university, he dropped out.. 
 
It might seem surprising that he ended up working as a stockbroker but it was a family 
firm and the family protected the weakest.  The weakest, not the most talented member of 
the family ended up in the business.  His father gave him his share in the business.  They 
were a very close family and Berlin had a lot riding on making a success of his new 
career. He became work-obsessed and was known as the risk taker whilst Saul Sayers, the 
senior partner was regarded as conservative in the extreme.  The mix seemed to serve the 
firm well for a number of years.  Berlin believed he deserved 50% of the shares of the 
company and strove to prove he was a more competent broker than his cousin Saul 
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Sayers.  
 
Berlin was an incongruous figure in the company’s sedate offices.  The former novice 
monk rarely left his computer, clocking up client orders at a rapid rate.  Indeed, he rarely 
left the office, arriving before others and working late into the evening.  His career as a 
stockbroker was his new vocation.  His frenetic behaviour was attributed to a deep desire 
to meet investor’s demands at the height of a bull market.  In fact, he had become 
addicted to high risk trading in futures and options. Berlin ended up stealing money not to 
accumulate wealth but to prove he was worthy of his position.  His choice of gambling 
vehicle caused the fraud to grow exponentially.  With derivatives, profits and losses can 
mount up very quickly because you are leveraged up 10 times.  At least 50% of the 
deficit in Sayers was created in the last two or three months. 
 
Once anomalies were noticed, Berlin disappeared.  For two weeks after Berlin 
disappeared, the firm could have been saved but his absence, duplicity and lies were 
worse than his original crime.  During the period, Berlin made a suicide attempt but 
eventually gave himself in. and the court heard of his psychological problems. 
 
The stories above depict three different perspectives on the closure of Sayers 
stockbrokers derived from interviews, newspaper and court reports.  The first story voices 
the official account most often cited in the press with Berlin as a psychotic villain, and. 
Sayers as a victim in the demise of a well-respected family firm.  The second account 
reflects the views presented in a number of interviews that too much attention is placed 
on Berlin and that Saul Sayers was the leader and yet seemed to take very little 
responsibility for monitoring his cousin, the junior partner.  Story three presents an 
interesting perspective on Berlin’s career, family and relationship with work.   These 
different perspectives will be analyzed shortly but firstly, a discussion on the research 
method employed here is necessary. 
 
 
Polyphony and Fiction in Narrative Research 
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This paper adopts a narrative approach to research.  The significance of narrative 
knowledge and the importance of narratives and stories in the greater study of 
contemporary organizations have been well recognized. Discussions have been 
influenced by the wider body of research on narrative knowledge within sociology, 
psychology and philosophy e.g.  Lyotard (1984, p. 23) who declared that narratives are 
the communal method by which knowledge is stored and exchanged: ‘they thus define 
what has the right to be said and done in the culture in question, and since they are part of 
that culture, they are legitimated by the simple fact that they do what they do’. In 
Lyotard’s view, narrative is a form of knowledge, and a narrator is one ‘who knows’. 
Bruner (1986), within psychology, similarly argued that there are two modes of 
knowledge construction, each providing distinct ways of ordering experience and 
constructing reality – the argument and the story.  
 
Drawing on some of the above sources, management researchers have turned their 
interest to narrative research. Czarniawska (1993, 1997, 1998, and 2003) called for a 
redeeming of narrative knowledge in humanities and social sciences in general and in 
organization studies in particular (Czarniawska, 1993, p. x). Brown, Gabriel and Gherardi 
(2009, p. 1) point out the importance of stories to organizational research due to the fact 
that they are always replete with meaning, often contain moral judgments and frequently 
elicit  strong emotional reactions.   There is at this stage a tradition of research on 
narrative and storytelling in organizations (see e.g. Boje, 1991, 2001; Gabriel, 1991, 
1995; Watson, 2000; Humphries and Brown, 2002; Currie and Brown, 2003. 
 
 A narrative method has been used in undertaking this research in order to capture the 
emotional experience of the closure of B.P. Sayers.  .  The firm of B.P.Sayers had only 
three full time employees in addition to the partners.  Two employees, a Sayers family 
member and two customers were each interviewed twice.  The interview method adopted 
here was akin to Schutze’s (1992) Biographical-Interpretive Method which was originally 
developed for the collection of life-stories of Holocaust survivors with the aim of 
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uncovering “faded-out memories”.  As Holloway and Jefferson, ( 1997) point out 
“anxiety leads to distortions and displacements” which demands a methodological 
strategy both to recognize and decode.  The Biographical-Interpretive Method was 
considered suitable for my research as the context of the closure of Sayers could be 
described as anxiety-ridden (involving a suicide attempt, mental illness, the loss of life 
savings, the ruination of careers and marriage breakdown).  The method involves open-
ended questions, avoids “why questions” and follows –up using the respondents 
ordering/phrasing.  Often as narrative researchers, we expect interviewees to be reflexive 
and articulate when in fact they are often shy, or afraid that their story may be 
unacceptable or they may want to protect their privacy.  In addition, we seek the 
subjectivity of interviewees, want access to their emotional lives but fail to establish 
rapport.  Interpretive-biographic research places a significant emphasis on establishing 
authenticity; the researcher provides an autobiography and each individual is interviewed 
twice.  The method is most suitable where there are a small number of interviewees and 
significant time is devoted to each interview.  In addition to interpretive-biographical 
interviews, this research involved close inspection of newspaper coverage and court 
reports of the case of B.P. Sayers. 
 
Organizational researchers such as Boje (1995, 2001), Currie and Brown (2003) and 
Collins (2003) adopt a postmodern approach to storytelling in which the authors attempt 
to illustrate the multiple and competing stories which vie for space in organizations. As 
Boje (2001, p. 1) points out, ‘the crisis of narrative method in modernity is what to do 
with non-linear, almost living storytelling that is fragmented, polyphonic (many voiced) 
and collectively produced’.  Collins (2003) takes a similar approach in his ‘re-view’ of 
the transformation of Sears Roebuck in which he sets out to destabilize the dominant 
narrative of Sears produced in a Harvard case, offering more local understandings of the 
change process. The dominant story of Sears is a heroic one, one where leadership is 
celebrated, but Collins retells the story as a tragedy (involving exploitation of workers) 
and as a comedy (where shortly after the Harvard publication, cracks begin to show and 
leaders who took the credit are cast as fools).  This emphasis on presenting multiple 
stories and voices is influenced by Bakhtin who strongly advocated the concept of 
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dialogical plurality and heterogeneity and refuted monologism.  Even within our own 
narratives, Bakhtin (1986, p. 195) argues that we take on other people’s voices and our 
stories are replete with other people’s words “…with some of them we completely merge 
our own voice, forgetting whose they are; others, which we take as authoritative, we use 
to reinforce our own words; still others, finally, we populate with our own aspirations, 
alien or hostile to them.”  In-keeping with Bakhtin’s emphasis on polyphony, I have 
presented the story of B.P. Sayers from three different and competing perspectives.   
 
The interview material and other documentation were used to write the three stories of 
the closure of B.P. Sayers.  This paper does not follow the traditional approach taken by 
narrative researchers of presenting interview excerpts which is often problematic for the 
reader as the excerpts are commonly devoid of context and context is material in the 
production of meaning (Hansen, 2006, p. 1049).  Instead, the author has written three 
stories drawing heavily on the interview and documentary material.  The main reason for 
this is the sensitive nature of the material and the fact that interviewees did not want to be 
identified.  No one voice is therefore presented in this paper.  Each story is the 
combination of multiple voices.  The research authentically sought to capture and represent 
the meaning that the closure of B.P. Sayers had for employees, relatives and clients of the 
company through carrying out in-depth biographic-interpretive interviews.  However, the 
stories presented are written by me and could be described as fitting with  Watson’s (2000, p.) 
concept of ethnographic-fiction in that “it is `made up' but it is also `true'. It uses 
imagination but is also theoretically informed and draws upon research fieldwork.” 
 
The analysis in this paper involved a dialectic process of carefully considering relevant 
literature alongside close listening to, reading and writing of the narrative material in 
order to uncover points of resonance and disparity between the literature and the 
narratives.  Each perspective offers an alternative insight into the possible explanation for 
fraudulent behavior in B.P Sayers.  Some perspectives resonate with issues which have 
hitherto been discussed in the organization and management literature such as succession 
in family business and ethical leadership and therefore these are discussed but not in 
extensive detail.  Presenting the stories from different and competing perspectives is 
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helpful in generating new insights on a much-discussed issue.  In the case of B.P. Sayers, 
the third story presented in this paper offers a perspective on fraudulent behavior which 
has not received much attention heretofore, namely workaholism.  The relationship 
between workaholism and fraud therefore is a strong focus of the paper.   
 
 
Succession and Leadership Failure 
 
 
The first story represents the official account of events most commonly cited in the media 
and also by clients who lost money in the closure of B.P. Sayers .  Here the closure  is 
due to the actions of a psychopath addicted to gambling and all others involved including 
Senior Partner Saul Sayers are victims of this isolated event.  Justice is served as he 
receives a prison sentence and every effort must be placed on ensuring  that clients who 
lost money are compensated. 
 
The second story offers a more in-depth account of the dysfunctional nature of 
B.P.Sayers and echoes themes in the business ethics and family business literature.  The 
firm of B.P.Sayers undoubtedly suffered from problems in family business succession.  
This applies in the case of both Berlin and Saul Sayers who were equally unsuited to the 
world of stock broking.  Both were forced into the profession by their fathers just as they 
had originally been encouraged to partake in religious life for which they clearly felt 
equally unsuited.  Family business failure arising from unclear succession plans, incompetent or 
unprepared successors, and family rivalries has been well researched in the family business 
literature see e.g.  (Dyer, 1986; Handler, 1990, 1992, 1994; Hugron, 1993; Lansberg, 1999; 
Morris et al., 1997; Pitts, 2000).  Miller et al. (2003, p. 514) point out that much of the time 
in family business successions do not work out well because “personal and emotional 
factors” come into play especially in father to son successions “where the desires of a family 
for their children dictate that a son take over the business regardless of suitability.”  This appears 
to be the case with both Sayers and Berlin with Berlin in particular being selected because of his 
weakness rather than strength which seems counter-intuitive.  The response to their new positions 
from Berlin and Sayers are consistent with  Kets de Vries and Miller’s (1984, 1987) categories of 
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dysfunctional incumbent behavior : overdependence and conservatism (Saul Sayers) which 
occurs as a response to an overly-controlling parent,  and rebellion  (Berlin) which is likely when 
a successor is in awe  of a highly successful, and entrepreneurial parent.   It is not just the 
relationship between parent and child however that is significant here but also the relationship 
between successors who Milton (2008, p. 1071) suggests need to confirm one another’s identities.  
Interestingly, story two suggested that Saul Sayers as senior partner had little regard for his 
cousin and that this fuelled Berlin to assert his identity as the risk-taking stockbroker.  
Dysfunctional family relationships (e.g. over-bearing father in the case of Saul Sayers), poor 
choice of successors (using the family firm to provide protection for the weakest family member 
who may not easily be employed elsewhere in the case of Berlin) as well as a failure of the 
successors to confirm each others identities (Sayers failure to accept Berlin) all contribute to an 
understanding of why the firm of B.P. Sayers was dysfunctional and offer one possible 
understanding of why the firm collapsed. 
 
The second story is particularly interesting because it focuses our attention on Saul Sayers rather 
than Berlin, who committed the fraud encouraging us to consider the significance of leadership in 
the failure of B.P. Sayers.   According to story two, Saul Sayers was both a weak and egocentric 
leader and the organization was dysfunctional with inappropriate control over employees who 
behaved deviantly in the past.  Berlin went unpunished for incurring huge personal trading losses 
10 years previously and he was in fact promoted instead of monitored.  It is therefore Sayer’s 
failure to take responsibility and monitor Berlin that ultimately lead to the collapse of Sayers.  
This view is in keeping with the growing body of research which positions leadership as 
having a central role and responsibility in constituting organizational or business ethics.  
For example, Arjoon (2000) argues that the crises that business and society face today are 
the crises of leadership and ethics, Minkes et al. (1999, p. 328) argue that conformity to 
ethical requirements is a responsibility of, and depends on, the leadership in the 
organization, and Maier (2002) proposes that leadership approaches should be more 
collaborative than controlling and more values-based than outcome-focused.  Similarly, 
Sims and Brinkmann (2002, p. 327) explain unethical behavior in organizations as 
resulting from the interaction between disputable leadership and ethical climate. Many 
researchers focus on the development of a specific virtue essential in leadership, for 
example Molyneaux (2003, p. 347) emphasizes “meekness” which he argues is an 
important personal quality for highest-level leadership: “meekness” is not about “powers 
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foregone” but “powers controlled and exercised with discernment”.  Similarly, Morrison 
(2001) focuses on “integrity”, which he argues forms the foundation of character and is 
essential to sustainable global leadership since without integrity, leaders will never 
generate goodwill or trust. Drawing on Plato’s work, Takala (1998) emphasizes the 
virtues of “prudence, courage, temperance and justice”, in his investigation of ethical 
leadership. The official story, most often cited in the media saw Saul Sayer as a victim 
but story two suggests that the firm of B.P.Sayers suffered from a lack of leadership, and 
moral guidance. Saul Sayers was a reluctant leader as well as a reluctant stockbroker and 
leadership failure and a lack of engagement with business ethics issues are plausible 
explanations of why moral breakdown occurred in B.P. Sayers. 
 
  
Workaholism and Deviance 
 
The benefit of a polyphonic approach to narrative research is that it provides different and 
complimentary explanations of the meaning of  events.   Issues of succession and 
leadership provide at least partial explanation for fraud and failure at B.P. Sayers.  In 
story three, Berlin is presented as an obsessive and frenzied worker who has little interest 
in his colleagues or family and spends the majority of his time in the office.  It is 
interesting to explore Berlin’s relationship with working and the possible link between a 
dysfunctional relationship with working and a propensity to engage in deviant or 
unethical behavior.  A common explanation for fraud is an addiction to gambling but 
perhaps more interestingly, in Berlins’ case, the obsession is not with gambling or the 
accumulation of wealth but rather with working.   
 
It is worthwhile considering in more detail the nature of Berlin’s relationship with 
working. Berlin failed at his academic work in a family of academic high achievers.   His 
next ‘career move’ was to enrol as a Benedctine monk seemingly to please his religious 
father.  Monastic life would have emphasised devotion, worship, and dedication, values 
which Berlin seemed to take with him to the corporate world. .  Although Benedictine 
Monks emphasize balance between prayer and work, a considerable importance is placed 
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on work as the great equalizer, clearly a value which Berlin identified with.  On leaving 
the monastery, Berlin is handed over 40% share in the family business.  He has one more 
chance to prove himself worthy of his position in the family.  He becomes a dedicated 
broker, taking on the role of risk-taker.  He achieves some level of success and fuelled by 
this, works harder and for longer and takes more risks until his risk-taking escalates out 
of control. 
 
The literature on workaholism engages with some of the issues about work raised in the 
third story of B.P. Sayers in which the frenetic work behaviour of Berlin is described.   
The term ‘workaholism’, it is claimed, originated with Oates (1971, p. 11)  who sought to 
analyze  individuals whose need to work had become so exaggerated that it posed a  
significant threat to their health, personal happiness, interpersonal relations and social 
functioning.  Ng et al (2007, p. 114) later defines workaholics as those whose emotions, 
thoughts and behaviours are strongly dominated by their work whilst O’Driscoll and 
Burke (2003) suggest that workaholics allocate an exceptional amount of time to work 
and work beyond what is reasonably expected to meet organizational or economic 
requirements.  Finally, Schou Andreassen et al (2007, p.616) argue that in addition to 
being preoccupied with their work, “workaholics” can be described as task-oriented, 
compulsive, perfectionistic, neurotic, rigid, highly motivated, resourceful, impatient, and 
self-centred.  Berlin appeared to become increasingly obsessive about working, devoting 
his time and attention to trading whilst losing interest in his colleagues, and regarding his 
clients in a purely instrumental manner. 
 
Much of the work that followed Oates consisted of typological research which considered 
both positive and negative aspects of workaholism.  For example,  
Naughton (1987) proposed two types of workaholics based on the dimensions of career 
commitment and obsession-compulsion: job-involved workaholics and compulsive 
workaholics (as well as the categories of non-workaholics and compulsive non-
workaholics).  Job-involved workaholics with high work-commitment and low obsession-
compulsion are claimed to perform well in demanding jobs and are highly job satisfied, 
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but have low interest in non-work activities.  Compulsive workaholics on the other hand 
who have high work-commitment and high obsession-compulsion are described as 
potentially poor performers.   Spence and Robbins (1992)  distinguish between 
workaholics who experience high levels of work involvement, feel compelled to work but 
derive little pleasure from work, work enthusiasts who immensely enjoy and are heavily 
involved in work but do not feel compelled to work, and enthusiastic workaholics who 
are highly involved in work, feel compelled to work and also enjoy work .  Similarly, 
Scott et al. (1997, p. 293) identify three types of workaholism patterns: compulsive-
dependent (where high levels of anxiety stress, physical and psychological problems and 
poor performance are present), perfectionist (where in addition to stress and ill-health, 
hostile inter-personal relationships and high rates of absenteeism and turnover are 
experienced), and achievement-orientated (where performance is excellent and rewards 
are high).  In-keeping with Scott, Boje and Tyler (2008) also identify the good and bad 
workaholic.  They stress that work is socially constructed as the centre of life in late 
modern capitalism and describe the irrational assumptions which the workaholic holds 
such as “you are worthless without your work”.  “You will die without your work. (Boje 
and Tyler, 2008, p183).  Indeed the philosopher Arendt (1959, p.10) suggested that “work 
[can] bestow a measure of permanence and durability upon the futility of mortal life and 
the fleeting character of human time”.  It is with the negative aspect of workaholism that 
I am here interested in; although perhaps initially Berlin may have appeared to fit with 
Naughton’s job-involved workaholic, Scott’s achievement-oriented workaholic or Spence 
and Robbins enthusiastic workaholic, serving the company well for a time as the risk-
taking broker.  Over time however, Berlin’s obsessive approach to working only had 
negative consequences.  This view is supported  by Ng et al. (2004, P126)  who argue 
that it is important to differentiate short-term and long-term consequences of 
workaholism  and suggest that although workaholics may exhibit superior job 
performance in the short-term, over the long term they are likely to experience poorer 
mental and physical health, poor social relationships which will reduce work 
effectiveness.  They also suggest that the positive categories described above such as 
Spence and Robbin’s enthusiastic workaholics, involve an addiction  to the type of work 
rather than to working,  and they make the point  that  it obsession with the act of 
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working and not the nature of work that characterize workaholics .   
 
Ng et al. (2004, p. 114) draw on addiction research to explain workaholism focusing on 
the three dimensions of addiction: affect, cognition and behavior.  Addiction involves 
compulsion, loss of self-control and continued engagement in spite of adverse 
consequences.  Berlin continued to trade recklessly and illicitly despite being 
reprimanded for similar offences ten years previously.  According to Ng et al. (2004, p. 
127), workaholics are obsessed with working, have low self-esteem, work long hours and 
allow excessive involvement of work into their personal lives.  In addition, they argue 
that workaholism can produce some negative cognition-related outcomes, such as poor 
mental health, perfectionism and distrust of coworkers.  Workaholics, they argue become 
cognitively exhausted over time.  In the Court case, Berlin was described as suffering 
from exhaustion, and poor mental health and perhaps his ill-health can in some way be 
attributed to his obsession with working and his deep desire to establish his identity as a 
trader.  Ultimately, Berlin’s desire to succeed at all costs appears to have contributed to 
his irresponsible behavior and ultimately to the downfall of B.P. Sayers. 
The implications of workaholism in terms of physical and mental health have been 
considered in the literature discussed above.  Indeed, Al Gini (1998, p. 48) goes so far as 
to describe workaholism as a progressively fatal disease referring to the Japanese Karoshi 
or “sudden death from work” (Berlin indeed made a suicide attempt).  What is under-
explored however is the relationship between workaholism and deviancy or moral 
breakdown.  This is particularly interesting in the context of B.P. Sayers  but also the 
financial sector generally where workaholism is potentially high as working excessively 
long hours and  risk-taking are rewarded and instances of fraud and corruption are high as 
evidenced by a spate of recent financial and moral scandals.  Galperin and Burke (2006, 
p. 332) make a significant contribution in exploring deviance as one of the consequences 
of workaholism.  They define deviance  as voluntary behavior that violates 
organizational norms and argue that destructive deviance occurs where organizational 
member s experience a strong inner drive to work,  have poor social relationships in the 
workplace and  in acts of frustration and desperation engage in destructive deviant acts.  
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(Galperin and Burke, 2006, p. 442).  Their work resonates strongly with the description 
of Berlin and his working life offered in story three.  For Berlin, work became the “sole 
reservoir of identity” (Fassel, 1990, p.10), and in order to maintain this identity, Berlin 
lost sight of his colleagues, customers and family and his ability to sense-make was 
impaired leading ultimately to fraud.  Researchers continue to consider possible 
explanations for fraudulent behavior and workaholism provides one plausible explanation 
which has so far received little attention. 
  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper explores possible explanations for fraud and deviant behavior in the 
workplace.  The case of B.P. Sayers which collapsed as a result of the fraudulent 
behavior of the junior partner in the firm is presented from three different and competing 
perspectives, each suggesting a different possible explanation for fraud.  Succession 
failure and a lack of ethical leadership offer two plausible explanations which are 
outlined in the paper.  A third perspective however which has hitherto received scant 
attention in the organization and management literature is considered in more detail 
which concentrates on the existential aspect of working and examines workaholism as a 
possible explanation for fraud.   
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